The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway's civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission's findings, the article focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway's relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decisionmaking dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway's record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US both highlights and helps to problematize the challengespolitical, practical and moral -facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. As for Norwegian efforts in Faryab, the article sees them as revealing of the many dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway's experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.
the long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry in the UK, released in July 2016, has raised questions relating to strategy, policy and planning for international interventions that transcend the story of the UK's involvement in Iraq, so the Godal Commission's detailed and comprehensive evaluation of Norway's involvement in Afghanistan raises issues that are of broader analytical and policy interest. 10 In exploring the Commission's findings, we identify and focus on two sets of issues in particular.
The first of these concerns Norway's relations with the US, a long-standing and close strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decisionmaking in Afghanistan dwarfed that of all other coalition partners. How Norway prioritised and managed its relations with the US serves both to highlight and to problematize the challenges -political, practical and moral -facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside one dominant, agenda-setting power committed to the pursuit of a "global war on terror". One of the central issues raised by the Godal Report in this respect centres on how much scope for manoeuvre and independent action Norway possessed in dealings with the US over Afghanistan.
Similarly, and again of comparative interest, how did Norwegian governments reconcile and seek to balance domestic political pressures with US demands and operational priorities, especially when these were in obvious conflict with one another?
The second set of issues relates to developments in the province of Faryab in northern Afghanistan, where, from 2005 to 2012, Norway was responsible for one of 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) established, nominally under ISAF, to bring security, good governance and development to Afghanistan's provinces. In this capacity, Norway funded civilians aid programmes, interacted with local powerbrokers, engaged with the political economy of the province, and, in theory at any rate, sought to impose its priorities and apply its approach to stabilisation and statebuilding within its area of responsibility. As will be argued more fully, Norway's activities in Faryab province, its effort to bring stability and extend the authority and reach of the central Afghan government to the north, are revealing of many of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, in the end, fatally undermined the exceeded that of Netherlands (2,2%), Sweden (1.8%), and Denmark (1.1%), and it compared favourably to larger donors such as Germany (6.3%) and the UK (6.3%). Godal Report, p.78. 10 Report of Iraq Inquiry (henceforth Chilcot Report), 6 July 2016, available in full at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/ international intervention as a whole. 11 As such, Norway's experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the grand attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.
Approaching these issues, the article proceeds in two parts. Part one identifies and discusses the major findings of the Godal Report, focusing on the core objectives of Norway's mission, their implementation and the extent to which they can be said to have been met. It places Norwegian decisions and actions within the context of the US-led involvement in the country after 2001 and, in particular, the overarching priority given by successive American administrations to fight what they chose to define as a global and open-ended "war on terror". It emphasises how decisionmaking in Norway and policy outcomes in Afghanistan were shaped by conflicting domestic and international political pressures, by enormously complex and demanding Afghan realities on the ground, as well as by a machinery of government that was anything but "joined-up" and by governments that failed to develop a clear strategy -as distinct from expressing a desirable end-state -for its engagement in Afghanistan.
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The second part explores Norway's relations with the US in greater detail. It highlights the degree to which the perceived importance of being seen as a "good ally" conditioned reflexes and structured Norwegian choices. It also, however, asks
whether Norwegian concerns about the potentially damaging effects on USNorwegian relations of choices made in relation to Afghanistan were in fact exaggerated, and whether, as a result, Norway's room for diplomatic manoeuvre and more independent action were thus needlessly constrained.
THE GODAL REPORT: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS Three Core Objectives: Overview and Score Card
Norway's military, civilian and financial contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was designed to advance three core 11 For a systematic exploration of these contradictions, see Astri Suhrke, When More is Less -The International Project in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2011) . 12 The regional context, discussed in the Commission's report, is also critical to an understanding of policy outcomes but is not directly related to the foci of this article.
objectives. Although these were officially presented as mutually reinforcing, their coexistence was fraught with tensions from the outset -a reality that became ever more apparent as the war intensified and the contradictions inherent in the international state-building project in Afghanistan deepened after 2006. Changes in the balance of international and domestic political pressures bearing on cabinet decision-making in Oslo ensured that the relative weight attached to each objective varied over time in the official discourse about Norway's role in Afghanistan. Even so, and as the Godal Commission makes abundantly clear, the objectives themselves and, crucially, the hierarchy of importance among them remained constant.
The first and single most important objective was to demonstrate Norway's reliability as a steadfast and dependable ally of the US, an objective also deemed vital to "safeguarding" NATO. 13 The title of the Godal report -"A Good Ally" -points to the centrality and consistency of this objective over time. The Commission noted that the determining influence of this objective on the character of Norway's involvement in Afghanistan was greater than the public discourse about that involvement would appear to suggest. 14 The perceived need to preserve and strengthen the strategic alliance with the US framed deliberations and influenced all of the government's more specific decisions over Afghanistan. As such, it extended beyond the initial, perfectly understandable, and widely shared display of solidarity with the US following the attacks of 9/11. As a key factor in decision-making regarding military contributions to the international mission in particular, the Norwegian government's desire to demonstrate its political reliability as an ally overshadowed any assessment of the actual effect that a given contribution might have on the ground. As a core objective, the determination of successive governments to demonstrate Norway's credentials as a reliable and politically visible ally, and to reap benefits therefrom, was -in the view of the Godal Commission -very largely achieved: the closeness of bilateral ties at the political level was reaffirmed, while, at the operational and tactical levels, cooperation with the US in Afghanistan has translated into "strengthened cooperation" in the fields of intelligence, counter-terrorism and "other SOF operations". 
Determinants of Norway's Record in Afghanistan
The reasons for Norway's failure to meet its core objectives, save that of demonstrating her reliability as "a good ally", are, to a degree, inseparable from the reasons behind the failure of the international intervention in Afghanistan as a whole. Of particular and lasting significance in this respect were the decisions taken and the tone set in the early OEF phase, before NATO, in assuming command of ISAF, committed itself to extending the authority of central government throughout the country. During this period, US forces -spurred on by the desire for retribution and revenge following the events of 9/11 -cultivated and formed alliances with local and regional strongmen and warlords, many of whom had risen to prominence in the deeply destructive civil war that followed the collapse of President Najibullah's regime in 1992. By restoring power at the provincial and district level to predatory, violent warlords and their tribally-based patronage networks who had lost out to Taliban in the mid-1990s,US-led coalition forces laid the ground for Taliban's resurgence. Crucially, these actions also gave rise to a distinctive political economy of conflict that contrasted sharply with what Mike Martin has aptly termed the "insurgency narrative", 27 which came to underpin NATO policy: the tendency to reduce the conflict in Afghanistan to a struggle between a supposedly legitimate government seeking to create a modern, democratic and liberal-looking State, Tensions between strategic priorities, and the primacy given by the US to counterterrorism broadly conceived, had other consequences too. In terms of operations, it resulted in a complicated and dysfunctional set of command and control arrangements that included multiple and separate chains of command, within theatre as well as between capitals and troop-contributing nations. While this gave PRTs considerable autonomy, it undermined overall unity of effort and resulted in the pursuit of conflicting priorities. In particular, the actions of US Special Forces, notably their "kill and capture" tactics, repeatedly undermined the "goodwill that the ISAF 'hearts and minds' strategy aimed to develop", as Saikal noted in 2012. officially included in Faryab province and was thus incorporated in the domain of the Norwegian PRT.
The expansion was controversial for two reasons. Norwegian intelligence assessments had initially been divided. 40 While the Army intelligence unit posted to Faryab saw the Taliban factor as a systemic explanation for instability in the area, the Military intelligence service stressed the essentially local nature of the conflict dynamic, pointing to complex ethnic and parochial rivalries, including control over smuggling routes. 41 The Army view, as we have seen, won out. Secondly, the expansion was followed by a sharp escalation in armed clashes, both in Ghormach and in the districts of Faryab proper.
As the escalation and Norwegian losses mounted, the intelligence picture contained more nuances that pointed to the underlying tensions in the engagement as a whole. When, in 2010, Norwegian intelligence analysts sought to explain why Pashtuns were attacking Norwegian troops, three main reasons were put forward.
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The first was immediate economic gains, namely to protect opium smuggling routes.
The second stemmed from ethnic divisions that in this case, and by extension much of northern Afghanistan, caused problems in the statebuilding project at the provincial level. In Faryab, the Pashtuns formed a minority, were generally poorer than the rest of the population and had little representation in the formal institutions of governance. responsible to Parliament has also encouraged a tendency towards "departmentalism"
and "silos" in decision-making. 66 Indeed, this principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament is one reason "why Norway has strong line ministries while ministries with coordination responsibilities are relatively weak." 67 More fundamentally, however, lack of "jointness" was bound up in the aforementioned absence of overall strategic focus. This because, as Stewart and Brown perceptively note, true policy coherence can only emanate from a "common, government-wide strategic vision on priority objectives." 68 Without it, formal coordinating bodies, mechanisms and technocratic solutions designed to encourage coherence "by themselves cannot compensate for disagreement on ends". 69 The
Norwegian MOD was instinctively and reflexively focussed on the core objective of preserving and strengthening ties with the US (discussed more fully below), while the development community was, unsurprisingly, more concerned about promoting development objectives in Afghanistan. 
"A GOOD ALLY": NORWAY AND RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN
Norway's "Special Relationship" with the U.S.
The Chilcot Inquiry stressed the central importance of the UK's close and long-standing alliance relationship with the US as a "determining factor in the Government's decisions over Iraq." 71 On all key decision points, Chilcot concluded, the UK had "decided that it was right or necessary to defer to its close and senior partner". 72 The fundamental reasons for this were twofold: first, "concern that vital areas of co-operation between the UK and the US could be damaged if the UK did not
give the US its full support over Iraq", and, secondly, "the belief that the best way to influence US policy towards the direction preferred by the UK was to commit full and unqualified support, and seek to persuade from the inside."
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As noted above, Norway's long-standing alliance relationship to the US was also the determining factor in the government's decisions over Afghanistan. Indeed, preserving and strengthening the relationship with the US was the "first and most important objective for the whole of the period" between 2001 and 2014. 74 The first of the two reasons identified by Chilcot provide the key to also understanding Norwegian policy choices: for successive governments, concern that "vital areas of cooperation" might be undermined if Norway did not support the US was, as with the UK over Iraq, a major consideration in policy over Afghanistan. This concern was held most strongly within the Norwegian MoD, for whom maintaining close working ties with the US was, and has long been, at the very heart of its mission. Unlike the UK, however, Norwegian governments harboured far fewer illusions about the extent to which "full and unqualified support" would result in a greater ability to influence US policy. Indeed, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued the case for opening a political dialogue with the Taliban to its counterpart from an early stage, itself a commendable initiative, the Commission found that, overall, Norway made little systematic effort to influence and shape allied policies.
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That Norway's relationship to the US came to exercise a determining influence on decisions over Afghanistan is not surprising. Ever since the US replaced the UK as Norway's principal security guarantor in the 1950s, the strategic alliance with the US has been the bedrock of Norway's defence and security policy. Norway's position on NATO's northern flank, its sparsely populated and extensive land and maritime territories, combined with its proximity to the strategically vital northeast and arctic territories of Russia (and earlier those of the Soviet Union), ensured that bilateral security ties assumed special importance for both countries. For Norway, the result was and remains a particularly strong attachment -reinforced by the country's historical experience of defeat and occupation in the Second World War and its peripheral status in Europe -to the sanctity of NATO's collective defence provisions and, above all, to preserving US defence commitments to Europe in general and Norway in particular.
While the geopolitical changes spawned by the end of the Cold War necessarily altered the political climate and discourse around the content of Norway's security policy, it did not fundamentally change the importance attached to ties with the US, especially not for those concerned with the working aspects of that relationship. Indeed, if anything, its importance was seen to have increased as NATO allies in Europe were expected, not unreasonably, to take less of an interest in NATO's northern flank. To many, the closing of NATO's Atlantic Command in 2003 and the subsequent move away from geographic to functional commands within the Alliance provided evidence to this effect. Throughout the course of Norway's Afghanistan engagement, concerns among Norwegian defence planners and officials about any further weakening of collective defence provisions and ties with the US became, if anything, more pronounced. 76 Russia's adoption of a more "forwardleaning stand both politically and militarily" 77 , evidenced by the 2008 war in Georgia, did much to drive those concerns and provided a key background influence to decision-making over Afghanistan. 78 Added to this were also more immediate and concrete considerations relating to the defence and security relationship with the US.
In the event of crises or war, Norway has long been entirely reliant on reinforcements from the US. Preparing for this eventuality, US stocks of military equipment were first prepositioned on Norwegian territory following agreement concluded in 1981. 79 The agreement came up for renegotiation in 2005, and
Norwegian authorities considered its revision and renewal vital to the future of the bilateral defence relationship. 80 In June 2005, against the backdrop of NATO and
Norway's deepening involvement in Afghanistan, and following six months of reportedly "intensive" talks, Donald Rumsfeld and his counterpart, Kristin KrohnDevold, duly signed a revised MOU "governing prestockage and reinforcement of Norway".
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Norwegian concerns about the possible consequences for US-Norwegian relations were it not to extend support to the US, influenced policy calculations in two ways.
First, decisions about the kind of contributions to make were driven primarily by considerations -both explicit and implicit -of their likely political impact in relation to the US, rather than by a wider assessment of strategic requirements emanating from an analysis of developments on the ground. Second, concern about relations with Washington in practice limited the scope for questioning the wisdom of US and wider alliance policies in Afghanistan. In effect, the concern acted as a self-denying ordinance, restricting the government's room for manoeuvre, for registering constructive dissent and voicing principled objections to actions that were not producing hoped-for results. It also provides an important part of the explanation for why Norway never seriously subjected its contribution to a rigorous and regular process of strategic analysis and reassessment. 89 In the end, the government formally ruled out deploying its QRF to the south or to make other forces available in that area. The decision was designed to clarify Norway's position vis-à-vis NATO allies, but above all to keep the Red-Green coalition together.
And yet, for all this, and although UK and US officials at the time expressed frustration at Norwegian reluctance to deploy south, the Godal Commission could find no evidence to suggest that the refusal to do so "had serious or lasting consequences for relations with allies or for Norway's standing within NATO".
There were several reasons for this. For one, it is clear that Norway's contribution would in any event have been very modest. Furthermore, the decision to extend the deployment of Norwegian Special Forces to Kabul in 2007 -whose impact was politically and operationally more visible to the US -may partly have compensated for the reluctance to assist in the south. 91 Signs that the security situation was deteriorating also in Northern Afghanistan made the Norwegian argument that troops were needed in the north seem less self-serving. Arguably just as significant was the fact that Norway was not proposing to withdraw from ISAF and Afghanistan altogether. For the US Administration, this meant that the multinational character of the operation, however small or symbolic the contribution of individual allies, would not be weakened. This was an important consideration for an administration that needed to legitimise continued involvement in the war before Congress, which, after all, was paying for it, and probably outweighed the military value added by the actual contribution allies were prepared and able to offer.
In addition to these factors, however, and more fundamentally, the strength of long-established alliance bonds and the mutual benefits deriving from these were always unlikely to be ruptured by Norway's self-imposed restrictions. 98 There is nothing to suggest that a different and more independent approach by Norway would have influenced US policy in significant ways. Even so, developments on the ground should have fed back into an assessment of Norway's own contribution to stimulate a far more critical debate about what one was hoping to accomplish and a consideration of policy adjustments .
Concluding Observations
The Norwegian contribution to operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was plainly of marginal relevance to the overall outcome of the international intervention in the country. 99 Even so, the fine-grained analysis provided by the Godal Commission, especially of developments within Norway's area of responsibility in northern Afghanistan, offers lessons of broader interest regarding the role of small and medium-sized coalition members in international operations, about the limits of exogenous statebuilding and about the recent history of conflict in Afghanistan.
The first "lesson" concerns Norway's decision to join, as well as its unwavering commitment over thirteen years to, the international project in Afghanistan. The initial decision to participate in coalition operations was powerfully motivated -as indeed it was for other allies -by the desire to demonstrate solidarity with the US following the attacks of 9/11. In the context of its time and given
Norway's long-standing alliance relationship to the US, this was neither surprising nor unreasonable. Even for a small and historically close ally, however, the requirement of alliance solidarity does not absolve the government of responsibility for regularly reviewing and, when required, reassessing strategy in light of new developments and changing circumstances. In doing so, the option of withdrawing from coalition operations should never be ruled out, and concerns about the direction of policy, especially when it rests on questionable assumptions and weak analysis, Initially deployed to Jordan, Norwegian troops later joined Special Forces from the US and the UK at At Tanf in southern Syria to help "train, advise and support local Syrian groups fighting ISIL in Syria". The deployment confirmed the Godal report's findings about the increasingly close relationship developed with US in "CT and other SOF operations" resulting from years of cooperation in Afghanistan. At the same time, the deployment also raised questions about the extent to which "the aims of [Norwegian] involvement were clear and [had been] properly communicated to parliament and the wider public", as the Godal Commission, insisted should be done when deploying to active conflict zones. To many, being "a good ally" was again the driving factor for becoming involved. Godal Report, p. 203; "Pressemelding, 2 May 2016, Forsvarsdepartementet" (http://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nyyt-bidrag/id2499023/); Nabih Bulos and W. J. Hennigan "US Airstrike hit Pro-Assad Forces in Syria", Los Angeles Times, 18 May 2017. 101 Godal Report, p. 12. this and for being prepared -from an early stage and through active behind-thescenes diplomacy -to explore any opportunity for moving the political process in Afghanistan forward. The fact that, in the end, nothing of substance was achieved on this front does not invalidate the central importance, in current and future international operations, of investing resources, time and effort in building the political foundation for peace.
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